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High- Modernist Urban 
Planning in Beijing for 
Population Control
Philipp C.D. Immel   
Abstract
This article analyses the implementation process of Beijing’s current urban master plan 
using the background of modernisation theory. The line of thought behind the new 
urban master plan follows a high- modernist ideology embedded in an environment of 
reflexive modernity. Intermediate goals of the urban master plan are to tighten popula-
tion control and increase social legibility of the city, providing an additional explanation 
for state- led urbanisation besides economic reasons. Urban planning is thus used as a 
social control mechanism and has emerged as a new means to maintain social distinc-
tion, creating new forms of exclusion. It can be observed that disruptive Mao era style 
pushes are still being employed in the policy cycle even today. This becomes evident 
from the implementation style of urban planning, where campaign- style and regularised 
implementation methods are complementing each other. This is corroborated through 
documentary analysis, interviews, and fieldwork conducted by the author.
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Introduction
On 18 November 2017, a fire devastated a multipurpose building complex in Xinjian 
Village Number 2, Xihongmen Town (西红门镇新建二村, Xihongmenzhen 
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Xinjian’ercun) in Beijing’s Daxing (大兴) district. This fire killed nineteen people, 
among which were eight children, and injured another eight people. Subsequently, the 
inhabitants of the village were expelled from their homes at short notice and their houses 
demolished, because authorities deemed their housing situation to be unsafe. This rash 
expulsion of inhabitants sparked outrage among Beijing’s population and caused broad 
media coverage.
It seems odd that such abrupt measures are still possible in a time when much focus 
is laid on regularisation, for example through strategic planning (战略规划, zhanlüe 
guihua) and top- level design (顶层设计, dingceng sheji). This fundamental tension will 
be examined through the example of urban planning in Beijing, because the expulsion 
and subsequent measures had been justified with current urban planning documents.
China’s urbanisation has often been analysed from its economic incentives, and has 
been interpreted through neoliberalism or urban entrepreneurialism, for example. This 
article adds that its non- economic incentives, such as governance- related ones, can be 
understood through a framework of high modernism. Additionally, in order to under-
stand the Chinese state’s active role in urbanisation, this article adds that population 
control is also an important factor, linking up discussions of how hierarchies are created 
through urban planning and how state power is reproduced through it.
The Daxing example shows that a combination of high modernism as ideological 
basis and campaign- style implementation as practice is employed to consolidate power. 
More specifically, this article analyses Beijing’s urban master plan (2016–2035) in the 
context of modernisation. I argue that the Chinese government is employing high- 
modernist urban planning in the sense of Scott (1998) as a means for population control 
in its pursuit of modernisation. Its implementation practice follows institutionalised 
mobilisation (White, 1990). Through this, it creates new forms of social inclusion and 
exclusion.
The remainder of this article is organised as follows. First, I address current frameworks 
for interpreting Chinese urbanisation and how the state is an active player in it. The follow-
ing section presents an outline of the article’s conceptual approach based on modernisation 
theory. Then, I present an overview of urban planning in China as well as Beijing’s current 
urban master plan and its objectives. In order to illustrate the implementation style and 
rationale, I will then focus on one specific policy, namely the “Function Relocation, 
Renovation and Promotion” Initiative (“疏解整治促提升”专项行动, shujie zhengzhi 
cu tisheng zhuanxiang xingdong, hereafter FRRPI) (People’s Government of Beijing 
Municipality, 2017a), and how and why it was implemented through institutionalised 
mobilisation. Before concluding, I propose that the outcomes of both implementation prac-
tice and the underlying ideology of high modernism only serve to create more inequality, 
and that from an economic perspective, Beijing actually needs the people it is evicting.
The State’s Role in Urbanisation
Because urbanisation is an important process in China’s pursuit of modernisation, it is 
subject to scholarly discussion and interpreted in different ways. This article relates to 
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two strands of this literature. The first covers the state’s very active role in urbanisation. 
Whereas classical urbanisation is understood as being generated by economic progress, 
in China, the state is a driving factor behind urban build- up and resident relocation.
Reasons for this state- led urbanisation are primarily economic (Lin and Yi, 2011). 
After the household responsibility system (包干制, baoganzhi) was introduced in the 
early 1980s, and the tax- sharing system (分税制, fenshuizhi) in 1994, strong incentives 
and opportunities existed for local governments to generate revenue through the so- 
called land finance. This procedure means profiting from the price differentials between 
land rent and land conversion cost or compensation for land expropriation (Gao et al., 
2017; Lin and Ho, 2005; Ong, 2014; Tian and Yao, 2018; Zhou, 2007). These economic 
incentives have led to urban planning now being used as a governance tool to generate 
growth (Tian et al., 2017). Additionally, they have created an entanglement of the local 
state and the market, eventually making the local state a market participant (Xu et al., 
2009).
Many researchers have interpreted the state’s behaviour as neoliberal urbanism, 
meaning privatisation and commodification of property, housing, and land markets in 
addition to economic growth as the primary goal of urbanisation. Concurrently, the 
prominent position of the local state mentioned above is also stressed in this strand of 
literature (Gao et al., 2017; He and Wu, 2009; Lin and Yi, 2011; Ong, 2014; Tian and 
Yao, 2018; Xu et al., 2009).
However, due to the state’s dual role as a market actor and a regulator, the label of 
neoliberalism has been brought into question (Zhou et al., 2019). Therefore, following 
ideas such as Molotch (1976) “urban growth machine,” the project of employing market 
strategies and simultaneously being a market actor has been described as “urban entre-
preneurialism” (Wu, 2015) or “state entrepreneurialism” (Shin, 2009; Wu, 2018).
The entrepreneurialism model explains the phenomenon that the local state is able to 
occupy a monopolistic position, both in power and on the land market, while at the same 
time, neoliberal aspects such as commodification and marketisation of land are quite 
pronounced (Gao et al., 2017; Tomba, 2017). This article contributes to this body of lit-
erature by providing an additional explanatory model for the state’s approach to some 
aspects of urban planning, namely high modernism in the sense of Scott (1998).
The second strand of literature is concerned with the role of urbanisation with respect 
to hierarchies and population control. As urbanisation itself is subject to market logic, 
transformations of socio- spatial hierarchies also become contingent on market logic, 
leading to spatial segregation (He and Wu, 2009; Zhou et al., 2019). Since the state has 
monopolistic power in urbanisation, it also dominates the development of spatial pro-
duction (Wu, 2016).
This power over spatial production has also been deliberately used to create socio- 
spatial hierarchies by non- inclusion, for example through the household registration (户
口, hukou) system (Zhang, 2018). Consequently, the state is employing urbanisation and 
functional planning as governance tools for social control, as well as for the reproduction 
of state power (Tomba, 2017). This article maintains that in addition to non- inclusion, 
active exclusion through spatial segregation is still an important factor in creating 
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hierarchies, and that urban planning is used as an instrument to accomplish that. 
Specifically, in the Chinese case, high modernism is used as the framework that enables 
this exclusionary hierarchisation for social control, and it is further facilitated through 
the centralist, top- level design structure of urban planning in China.
Additionally, state entrepreneurialism engenders problems through its concept of 
“accumulation by dispossession” (Zhou et al., 2019: 36). Redevelopment strategies fre-
quently entail displacing residents, market- driven evictions, and compensating collec-
tive land owners far below market prices or even not at all, which leads to phenomena 
such as nail houses and landless peasants (Friedman 2017; Lin and Ho, 2005; Shin, 
2009; Zhang, 2018). Tomba (2017) even contends that in China, “urbanization is an 
extremely large and systematic gentrification project,” eventually constituting state- led 
gentrification (He, 2019). This article adds that besides the economic incentives, these 
redevelopment projects aim at population control and consolidation of state authority. 
Moreover, the article documents yet another case where residents’ interests were ignored, 
and where they were confronted with legal uncertainties and forceful evictions.
Research Questions, Analytical Frameworks and Data
As discussed above, the state is very active in China’s urbanisation. The state uses mod-
ernisation as its starting point for urbanisation and therefore modernisation discourses 
have been at the heart of Chinese urban planning for decades (Wu, 2015). Accordingly, 
we find a reference to modernisation in Chinese urban planning documents as early as 
the 1984 City Planning Ordinance (城市规划条例, chengshi guihua tiaoli). The ordi-
nance states that it was established among other reasons to “construct our country’s cities 
into modern, highly civilized socialist cities” (City Planning Ordinance, 1984: chap. 1, 
art. 1; translations mine unless noted otherwise). Indeed, already in the early Republican 
period, Shanghai, for example, was subject to modernist planning (Wu, 2015). Therefore, 
this article adopts a contemporary modernisation theory as its analytical lens.
Starting from this rationale, this article aims at answering the following two questions 
and discussing the proposed hypotheses. First, what factors resulted in the Daxing ten-
ants being forcefully evicted and their homes demolished? I suggest that according to the 
high- modernist framework, urban planning was used as a measure for population con-
trol. Second, under a unified urban planning framework, how was it possible that differ-
ent parts of the city received such different treatments? I suggest that campaign- style 
implementation was used as the method, which inherently includes varying strengths 
and efforts according to the location and circumstances.
In the case analysis, I adopted two analytical frameworks: for the theoretical classifi-
cation, I used the concept of high modernism as introduced by Scott (1998), which falls 
under modernisation theory; for the analysis of the implementation practice, I used a 
framework of campaigns established by White (1990). The eviction of residents in 
Daxing represents an extreme example of eviction being rationalised through urban 
planning policies. Hence, an analysis of this case is fruitful in helping our understanding 
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of how population control is integrated into urban planning and how it engenders new 
forms of exclusion.
Data were collected through one semi- structured expert interview with a member of 
the Beijing Municipal People’s Congress (Anonymous, 2018), four unstructured inter-
views with Beijing citizens, informal on- site observations, and a review of official doc-
uments and newspaper coverage between November 2017 and August 2018. I had a 
chance to conduct this research when I lived and studied in Beijing for half a year in 
2017/18. Yet, due to the political sensitivity of the subject, no extensive or formal field-
work was carried out.
High Modernist Planning
On the basis of this data, I propose that the current planning of Beijing is an expression 
of high- modernist authoritarian ideology according to Scott (1998). Prerequisites for 
high- modernist planning are as follows: “The first is the aspiration to the administrative 
ordering of nature and society” (Scott, 1998: 88); an aspiration which Scott termed high 
modernism. “The second element is the unrestrained use of the power of the modern 
state as an instrument for achieving these designs. The third element is a weakened or 
prostrate civil society that lacks the capacity to resist these plans” (Scott, 1998: 88–89). 
Modernist planning, then, can be summarised as “‘clean- sweep’ comprehensive plan-
ning” with an “emphasis on simplicity, order, uniformity and tidiness” (Taylor, 1998: 
165, 166).
High modernism also highly values science and scientific progress (Scott, 1998: 93). 
Furthermore, “the logic of efficient planning from above for large populations requires 
[…] that the number of values being maximized […] be sharply restricted—preferably 
to a single value” (Scott, 1998: 111).
Moreover, high- modernist planning comprises four main aspects. The first character-
istic is “Total City Planning” (Scott, 1998: 104), or comprehensive planning. This means 
that all aspects of cities and their development in all levels of detail are subject to the 
plan.
The next feature is “Geometry and Standardization” (Scott, 1998: 107). Geometrisation 
is achieved through the layout of roads; standardisation is obtained through functional 
division and hierarchical layering, but also through replacing individually owned shops 
with retail chains. This socio- spatial reorganisation constitutes a form of population 
control.
For Scott (1998: 106), the prime model of high- modernist urban planning was Le 
Corbusier, who contends: “formal order […] [is] a pre- condition of efficiency.” This 
needs to be contested, however, because “an urban order easily legible from outside […] 
has no necessary relationship to the order of life as it is experienced by its residents” 
(Scott, 1998: 58). Furthermore, outer tidiness does not necessarily bear any correlation 
with functional efficiency (Scott, 1998: 133). This is to say, ordering the environment 
will not order the system. Nonetheless, “planned functional segregation” (Scott, 1998: 
109) makes planning easier because many complex realities can be ignored and there 
only needs to be a focus on exactly one function.
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The third feature of modernist planning is “Rule by the Plan, the Planner, and the 
State” (Scott, 1998: 111). This implies a rather rigid, very hierarchical approach to plan-
ning that conforms to political goals more than to actual needs of the urbanites. Again, 
parallels can be drawn to Le Corbusier’s planning: “Functional segregation was joined 
to hierarchy. His city was a ‘monocephalic’ city, its centrally located core performing the 
‘higher’ functions of the metropolitan area” (Scott, 1998: 111). This is to say, the admin-
istrative hierarchy is being transformed into spatial reality. This is especially the case in 
national capitals, where the city serves as the administrative centre for the nation, the 
hierarchy of authority is strongly asserted, and the socio- spatial hierarchy is further 
solidified, again containing elements of social control.
The last characteristic is “the City as a Utopian Project” (Scott, 1998: 114), which 
works through social planning aspects and transformative aspirations. Transformative 
qualities form a part of modernist planning, because “integral, finally, to Le Corbusier’s 
ultramodernism was his repudiation of tradition, history, and received taste” (Scott, 
1998: 117). This notion manifests itself in the demolition of traditional- built housing in 
the name of progress, for example.
Institutionalised Mobilisation
Further, I propose that a form of campaign- style policy implementation called institu-
tional mobilisation (White, 1990) is employed. Even though campaigns were the regular 
mode of implementation during the Mao era, since Mao Zedong’s death, the Chinese 
leadership has developed its style in the direction of a more regular implementation pro-
cess (Perry, 2011). Nonetheless, “managed campaign[s]” (Perry, 2011: 43) constitute a 
framework that is still employed today.
In the Mao era, campaigns comprised large- scale mass mobilisation, whereas today 
higher cadres are mobilising lower cadres to accelerate and deepen implementation 
(Kennedy and Chen, 2018; Perry, 2011). Additionally, specific population groups, such 
as alley stewards, are mobilised through mass media calls to help in governance and 
supervision (Feng and Wang, 2017; Jing, 2018).
Institutionalised mobilisation is a “specific form of postrevolutionary mobilization” 
(White, 1990). It includes intensification of incentives, regional variation, a limited time-
frame, “practical results” as a goal, narrow mobilisation instead of mass mobilisation, 
and a defined target population (White, 1990: 62–63).
Urban Planning
Urban planning not only consists of the physical planning process, but also contains 
elements of social control (Abramson, 2006). Therefore, after the Chinese economic 
reform, from the beginning of the 1980s on wards, population growth has been con-
trolled through urban planning measures (Gu et al., 2015). Today, policies aim, for 
example, at “significantly decreasing floating population employed in low- end 
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industries” (Fengtai District Development and Reform Commission, 2016) and thus 
these policies serve as the basis to expel part of those people from Beijing.
Because Beijing’s population growth has already greatly exceeded the limits that 
were set in the previous urban master plan (Beijing Municipal Commission for City 
Planning and Land Resources Management, 2005), the city needs to find a way of 
coping with its ever- growing population in order to be able to develop sustainably. 
This is also in line with the 2014–2020 “National New- Style Urbanisation Plan” 
(国家新型城镇化规划, guojia xinxing chengzhenhua guihua), which stipulates strict 
population control for very large cities (more than five million inhabitants), while 
fully removing settlement restrictions in smaller cities (less than 500,000 
inhabitants).
First and foremost, Beijing’s government plans to reduce population by relocating 
people. This fits within a context of a high- modernist planning ideology, which strives to 
make the city more legible for the government and as such also more easily controllable. 
Through stricter control of the population, the government is able to further consolidate 
its power and through gentrification efforts in the city centre it is establishing spatial or 
even “cultural hierarchies” (Tomba, 2017).
In addition to creating hierarchies through relocation, urban planning in China is 
inherently hierarchical because of its close connection to greater regional planning. In 
the case of Beijing, planning is connected to Jing- Jin- Ji (京津冀, that is, Beijing–
Tianjin–Hebei) and the Xiong’an new area (雄安新区, Xiong’an xinqu), much in line 
with the urban master plan’s top–down approach. As Beijing stands at the top of this 
hierarchy, regional integration creates further opportunities to exploit its position (Gu 
et al., 2015). The hierarchical reordering into multiple layers of peripheries with differ-
ent levels of distinction further aids in solidifying social stratification. Because of the 
trend to include ever larger units into the hierarchy (Shue, 2018), it can be projected that 
this type of socio- spatial population control will not only be applicable to single cities 
and city compounds, but rather to the whole country. That is to say, the planning process 
exhibits self- similarity, or, drawing on Borges, forms an “Aleph- like creation” (Soja, 
1996: 158, fn. 9).
The government is employing different approaches to pursue these ends; most nota-
bly it is using regularised implementation mechanisms alongside campaign- style imple-
mentation, pointing to a “hybridicity” in planning instruments (Gu et al., 2015). Because 
the government stipulated the planning goals and implementation methods through a 
top–down approach, there was only very little public participation possible in their for-
mation. Additionally, people who have to relocate often do not deem the solutions that 
the government provides for them acceptable. This tension between interests leads to the 
government resorting to coercive measures to implement its plans.
Even though there are a number of people endorsing these measures, forcefully relo-
cating people and restructuring an area destroys the socio- spatial setup there. That means 
that grown societal structures are broken and supplanted by state- defined concepts. The 
urban master plan’s goal of “livability” needs to be questioned then, as it is clear that the 
state, and not the people, has the ultimate power of defining livability.
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Objectives of Current Urban Planning in Beijing
Even though the planning of cities has a long history in China, urban planning as a dis-
cipline only appeared recently. Contemporary urban planning aims at improving the 
living environment of city dwellers while drawing on different disciplines and approaches.
In the mid- twentieth century, urban planning in China was an expression of the coun-
try’s socialist alignment and took the Soviet Union as its model. During this time, the 
top–down, two- part planning approach of master plan (总体规划, zongti guihua) and 
detailed plans (详细规划, xiangxi guihua) was established (Wu, 2015). After the Chinese 
economic reform (i.e. “reform and opening- up,” 改革开放, gaige kaifang), the planning 
system became increasingly fragmented, and urban planning became subject to the over-
all economic growth prerogative.
Today, planners need to deal with the structural and physical legacies from that time, 
such as cellularisation and unequal development, creating tension with the progression 
towards global cities (Gu et al., 2015). These legacies notwithstanding, city building is 
still seen as a driver for growth (He and Wu, 2009; Tian et al., 2017), and the system is 
still fragmented due to the many parties involved in planning. Despite the two- part plan-
ning system still being in place, it is subverted through structural constraints and collu-
sion between the government and developers.
Beijing’s current urban master plan (2016–2035) (北京城市总体规划, Beijing 
chengshi zongti guihua, hereafter master plan) (Beijing Municipal Commission for City 
Planning and Land Resources Management, 2017) is based on the 2004–2020 urban 
master plan (Beijing Municipal Commission for City Planning and Land Resources 
Management, 2005). Work on compiling the current urban master plan began in 2014, 
after Xi Jinping’s inspection of Beijing on 26 February, and the plan was finally accepted 
as per the official reply (批复, pifu) on 13 September 2017 (Beijing Earthquake Agency, 
2017).
The master plan constitutes the top planning document for Beijing municipality and 
envisions Beijing becoming the national centre in four respects. Namely, these are the 
political centre (政治中心, zhengzhi zhongxin), cultural centre (文化中心, wenhua 
zhongxin), international communication centre (国际交往中心, guoji jiaowang 
zhongxin), and technological innovation centre (科技创新中心, keji chuangxin 
zhongxin). Most notably, however, it strives to reduce the population in Beijing munici-
pality’s centre and dispel non- capital functions (疏解非首都功能, shujie feishoudu 
gongneng) in order to attain this objective.
The master plan contains a set of forty- two numerical indicators against which its 
success is measured. They include population reduction in the six city districts, no fur-
ther population growth in the municipality, and reduction of construction land, but also 
an increase in the number of patents and labour productivity.
The plan employs science as a guiding standard for the planning process, and as an 
evaluation and measurement factor during the development process (see Perry, 2011). 
This can, for instance, be seen from the third chapter, which is entitled “Scientific 
Allocation of Resource Factors, Realising Sustainable City Development” (Beijing 
Municipal Commission for City Planning and Land Resources Management, 2017). 
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These factors point to the high value that science has in the high- modernist planning 
process, as well as to high modernism’s prerogative of total city planning. The findings 
then show a “mechanical” (Anonymous, 2018), utilitarian approach towards urban 
planning.
The scope of the master plan’s comprehensive planning reaches up to the greater 
organisation of Jing- Jin- Ji Metropolitan Region. This type of grand- scale thinking is a 
salient feature of modernist total city planning, as mentioned above. Le Corbusier, as the 
paragon of modernist planning, wanted to correct not a “disorder at ground level but a 
disorder that was a function of distance, a bird’s- eye view” (Scott, 1998: 106). The plan-
ners in Beijing, however, by expanding their scope to encompass hundreds of kilome-
tres, have arguably already reached for a God’s- eye view. This is very much in line with 
the trend of ever larger units of planning, as the 2010 “National Principal Function 
Zoning Plan” (全国主体功能区规划, quanguo zhuti gongnengqu guihua) exemplifies, 
which aims at planning the entirety of the Chinese territory by 2020 (Shue, 2018). 
Dividing the whole country into functional zones again betrays the high- modernist 
thinking that is underlying Chinese spatial planning processes.
By including Jing- Jin- Ji in Beijing’s urban planning, a regional hierarchy is estab-
lished. Moreover, inside the city as well, the socio- spatial hierarchy is affirmed: even 
though the master plan defines multiple centres, there is still a very strict hierarchy 
between the core area (核心区, hexin qu), central areas (中心地区, zhongxin diqu), edge 
groups (边缘集团, bianyuan jituan), and even more remote places. Moreover, by relo-
cating non–national level government organs to the new secondary centre in Tongzhou 
(通州), Beijing is transformed into a Corbusian monocephalic city and further exhibits 
modernist functional segregation.
From these examples, it becomes clear that the master plan is embedded in a high- 
modernist planning ideology. Below, I will focus on its aspect of population control that 
follows neatly from the high- modernist aspiration to make the city more legible for the 
government (Scott, 1998).
Function Relocation Policy
As mentioned above, the state ultimately holds the planning power in the two- part pro-
cess and uses top- level design to ensure compliance (for another example of population 
planning under top- level design, compare Alpermann and Zhan, 2019). That is to say, the 
detailed plans are directly derived from the master plan and follow a strict hierarchical 
order. Therefore, projects that are only outlined in the master plan are further specified 
in detailed plans. An example for such a subordinate project is the “Function Relocation, 
Renovation and Promotion” Initiative mentioned above.
In accordance with the master plan, this initiative chiefly aims at reducing the popu-
lation density in the city centre. Beyond that, the FRRPI also ties back to larger and more 
general objectives. This can be seen from its implementation opinion (实施意见, shishi 
yijian), which states that the goals of the initiative are to “further promote the coordi-
nated development of Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei, strive to eliminate non- capital 
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functions, optimize and enhance the core functions of the capital, and accelerate the 
construction of a world- class harmonious and livable city” (People’s Government of 
Beijing Municipality, 2017a). Overall, it is intended to “make the city run more orderly, 
make the city develop more efficiently, and make city life more convenient” (Jing, 2017).
Because one of the main objectives of the master plan is function relocation, and 
because the FRRPI as well sets out to relocate functions and people, it needs to be 
asked where these people and functions are supposed to go. In addition to the second-
ary centre in Tongzhou mentioned above, Beijing’s districts Shunyi (顺义), Daxing 
(大兴), Yizhuang (亦庄), Changping (昌平), and Fangshan (房山) will serve as receiv-
ing places for people and non- capital functions after they are driven out of the city 
centre (Beijing Municipal Commission for City Planning and Land Resources 
Management, 2017: chap. 1, sec. 4, art. 17, cl. 5 and chap. 2, sec. 5, art. 36). However, 
in November 2017, a large amount of people, mostly without Beijing hukou, were 
evicted from Daxing as a reaction to the fire mentioned in the introduction. The fact 
that people were evicted from a place that had been designated to receive population 
reveals a state- led social hierarchisation that follows from its high- modernist planning 
ideology.
Thus, during the process of city reorganisation, certain groups of people will be 
ousted from the city, marginalised, and displaced (Wu, 2016). Marginalisation of groups 
belonging to the lower end of the socio- economic scale can also be substantiated in the 
case of the FRRPI: the last of the policy’s points of action concerns the reconstruction of 
shanty towns, and clean- up and redevelopment of directly administered state- owned 
housing and “commercial changed to residential” housing (棚户区改造, 直管公房及 
“商改住” 清理整治, penghuqu gaizao, zhiguan gongfang ji “shang gai zhu” qingli 
zhengzhi). The reconstruction of shanty towns has been at the top agenda since at least 
2014 (General Office of the State Council, 2014), but market- driven evictions had 
already taken place long before (Friedman, 2017). A prominent example of this is the 
ubiquitous practice of demolition and relocation (拆迁, chaiqian) (Hsing, 2010: 108–
109). Even if market- driven evictions may not be “‘forced’ in the strictest legal sense, 
[…] most of them are disruptive and unnecessary, and are causing the same impoverish-
ment and destruction of housing investments and social support systems as ‘forced’ evic-
tions cause” (UNESCAP and UN- HABITAT, 2008: 2). Whereas successful relocation 
includes “participation of members, physical development of the resettlement area, 
award of compensation, social development and consolidation of livelihood” (Li et al., 
2015: 61), these aspects are largely not present in the case of the Beijing measures, as 
will be shown below.
While the government sees the reconstruction of shanty towns as development, it can 
be argued that “in almost every way, eviction is the opposite of development” (UNESCAP 
and UN- HABITAT, 2008: 8, original emphasis). However, this is primarily the case for 
the former inhabitants who were evicted, as discussed below. For the state, on the con-
trary, redevelopment constitutes “the last of the magical factors boosting housing sales” 




Because of its high- modernist underpinnings and top- down structure, the government 
resorted to coercive measures to carry out its plans, as can be seen from the Daxing 
evictions. I propose that the FRRPI is an example of down structure, the government 
resorted to coercive measures to carry out its plans, as can be seen from the Daxing 
evictions. I propose that the FRRPI is an example of institutionalised mobilisation. 
Because the FRRPI is implemented in a campaign style, it further challenges the propo-
sition that the “transition from revolutionary consolidation to postrevolutionary rule” 
(White, 1990) is complete.
Institutionalised Mobilisation
The criteria for institutionalised mobilisation outlined above are met in the case of the 
FRRPI: the aftermath of the 18 November fire mentioned above constitutes a mobilisa-
tion effort that intensifies coercive measures in the context of Beijing’s urban planning. 
The official investigation report, which was published on 25 June 2018, identifies “ille-
gal construction, illegal renting, long- term existence of security risks” (Beijing 
Administration of Work Safety, 2018) as indirect factors contributing to the start and 
spread of the fire. Nonetheless, it also states that “the town government has failed to 
implement the responsibility for territorial safety supervision, and has inadequate super-
vision over illegal construction, fire safety, floating population, and rental housing man-
agement” (Beijing Administration of Work Safety, 2018: 13).Subsequently, it has been 
classified as a “major work safety responsibility accident” (Beijing Administration of 
Work Safety, 2018: 15).
This direct official criticism of the town government in the final report corresponds to 
the harshness with which the official organs handled the incident: they reacted with an 
initiative called “Large- Scale Inspection, Cleanup, and Rectification of Security Risks” 
(安全隐患大排查, 大清理, 大整治专项行动, anquan yinhuan dapaicha, daqingli, 
dazhengzhi zhuanxiang xingdong), which lasted for forty days, beginning on 20 
November 2017 (People’s Government of Beijing Municipality, 2017b). In theory, it 
aimed at managing the existent risks and problems, fulfilling the above criterion of hav-
ing “practical results” as a goal. However, the initiative was perceived as an excuse to 
expel the “floating population” (流动人口, liudong renkou) and it was purported to be 
called “chasing away the ‘low- end population’” (低端人口, diduan renkou) (Beijing 
Youth Daily, 2017). The government, however, denied having referred to the affected 
population in this objectionable way. Further, it has deemed this appellation “irresponsi-
ble and utterly baseless” (Beijing Youth Daily, 2017). Contrary to this denial, Fengtai 
District’s current population development and control plan explicitly states: “The imple-
mentation of the Beijing- Tianjin- Hebei coordinated development strategy is conducive 
to the dispelling of low- end population [低端人口疏解, diduan renkou shujie] and the 
gathering of high- end population in Fengtai District” (Fengtai District Development and 
Reform Commission, 2016). Additionally, officials did expel migrants from their homes 
with just a few hours’ notice, effectively rendering them homeless in the Beijing winter 
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with temperatures around freezing point (Buckley, 2017a), which definitely does not 
resemble any kind of respectful or responsible treatment.
At first sight, the “Inspection, Cleanup, and Rectification” initiative could be per-
ceived as a direct reaction to the Daxing fire. However, seeing that the initiative wants to 
“integrate the ‘Function Relocation, Renovation and Promotion’ Initiative” (People’s 
Government of Beijing Municipality, 2017b), a hierarchical relationship between the 
two becomes evident, reflecting high modernism’s total city planning. Therefore, this 
initiative needs to be seen as a thin pretext to get rid of unwanted portions of the popu-
lation, rather than as an answer to the Daxing fire. This view is shared by many of the 
migrant workers (农民工, nongmin gong) (Buckley, 2017a). An article in the Chinese 
Communist Party journal Qianxian (前线, Frontline) even states that “putting in order 
the environments of back alleys is also closely connected to the central work of dis-
pelling population and low- end industries” (Feng and Wang, 2017: 83). In a larger con-
text, these circumstances corroborate the fact that managed campaigns are “capable of 
impressive achievements yet entailing substantial human cost” (Perry, 2011).
Another hallmark of institutionalised mobilisation is that the efforts vary across 
regions. In the case of the 18 November fire, the consequences were very different across 
Beijing’s districts: the city centre, for example Xicheng (西城) or Dongcheng (东城), 
only experienced rather mild repercussions in comparison to Daxing. This can be 
explained with Daxing’s new role, because the master plan defines Daxing as one of the 
places to receive functions and population dispelled from the city centre. Consequently, 
there are incentives for the state to gentrify Daxing to make it more attractive for said 
population. This differential treatment is another expression of high- modernist hierarchi-
sation, which places Daxing and its original inhabitants at a rather low level. It also 
results in very different perceptions of the same policy among the population, as I could 
establish through limited participant observation and conversations.
The efforts of institutionalised mobilisation are also limited in their time frame. The 
“Inspection, Cleanup, and Rectification” initiative was set to forty days, the FRRPI is 
envisioned to be finished by 2020, and the master plan sets its scope to 2035. This shows 
that the implementation takes place in short bursts according to its scope. In the case of 
“Inspection, Cleanup, and Rectification,” it is even safe to say “shock attacks” (White, 
2009: 107) (突击, tuji), even if it is upheld that dealing with back alleys has long become 
“regular work” (Feng and Wang, 2017: 83). This can be seen from initiatives starting to 
counter the kaiqiang- dadong (开墙打洞, “open a hole in the wall,” meaning unregulated 
vendors selling goods from their windows) phenomenon in mid-2017 (Myers, 2017). 
These initiatives respond to high modernism’s call for regularisation. Furthermore, even 
though Cai Qi (蔡奇) had been appointed as new party secretary of Beijing municipality 
only on 27 May 2017, the day after the Daxing fire, he personally called for “resolutely 
increasing cleanup efforts” (Beijing News, 2017: A6) and the city government was very 
quick to adopt correspondingly harsh measures (Friedman, 2017).
All three policies, that is, master plan, the FRRPI, and “Inspection, Cleanup, and 
Rectification,” aim at producing practical results. This is not only a constituent of the 
classic “engineering” (White, 1990) type of mobilisation, but also of institutionalised 
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mobilisation. At the same time, there is a combination of economic and transformational 
goals, which resembles earlier campaigns (Perry, 2011).
The propaganda aspect has been minimised for the “Inspection, Cleanup, and 
Rectification” initiative. This is partly because the government’s treatment of the migrant 
workers after the Daxing fire was met with strong public criticism (Jing, 2017), which, 
however, was suppressed quickly and news reports on the topic disappeared (Buckley, 
2017b).
Implementation Rationale
It remains in question why the government chose to implement the urban plans using 
campaign- style implementation, even though today, “the ‘Shanghai model’ of urban 
renewal, characterised by large- scale demolitions and evictions, has become infeasible 
even in the non- democratic regime of China” (Ren et al., 2018: 96).
Due to the “contingent nature of political implementation” (Liu et al., 2014: 92), it is 
perhaps unexpected, but not surprising, that the government has turned to a campaign- 
style implementation for these policies. Even though there are no regular mass mobilisa-
tion campaigns anymore, “in the area of population control, […] campaign methods 
continue to be employed” (Perry, 2011). Therefore, the government did employ cam-
paign methods when it aimed at regulating the floating population. Conversely, urban 
planning projects outside of population control, such as moving overhead wires under-
ground to increase safety, were accomplished without such measures.
According to Kennedy and Chen (2018), there are two goals in using a campaign 
implementation approach: one is to quickly obtain a measurable result, the other is to 
show the centre’s commitment to the policy. Another reason for campaign- style imple-
mentation is the shortage of time, as many of the goals set forth in the plans are sched-
uled to be reached in 2020, which is highly ambitious and therefore plans need to be 
implemented quickly and any hold- ups cannot be tolerated. This is also asserted by 
domestic analysts: “As the 2020 red line of population control in Beijing approaches, the 
pressure to mediate and disintegrate the population will continue to increase” (Li, 2017).
Another possible reason ties in with government power politics: If we accept “spatial 
rescaling [as] an outcome of conflict and […] state spatial selectivity […] as an instru-
ment of crisis management” (Zou and Zhao, 2018), then the government’s administra-
tive upscaling to Jing- Jin- Ji and its relocation to Tongzhou indicate tensions in 
local–central power politics, leading to crass measures.
Implications of Urban Planning in Beijing
In the preceding sections, the theoretical framework for Beijing’s urban planning and the 
subsequent implementation strategy have been described. This section portrays the new 
forms of social exclusion that result from high- modernist urban planning. These forms 
of exclusion include legal uncertainty, denial of free participation in the economy, dis-
crimination on the basis of household registration, and evictions, as mentioned above. 
Due to the sensitivity of the topic at the time, I employed so- called guerrilla interviews 
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(see Solinger, 2006). In these interviews, I was able to survey several different facets of 
the discourse concerning the restructuring of Beijing.
A shop owner in Dashilanr (大栅栏) subdistrict with whom I had an hour- long con-
versation on 7 February 2018 told me about the fate of his next- door neighbour, who had 
run a noodle restaurant for more than twenty years. Even though this neighbour had still 
possessed both a valid lease as well as a business licence, he had been notified by offi-
cials to vacate the premises within two weeks. At the time of my visit, said noodle restau-
rant had already been closed down. The shop owner was in a similar situation and feared 
being evicted at short notice, especially given the background of the Daxing evictions. 
Consequently, he chose to preemptively close down his business in order to minimise his 
potential losses.
A sanitation worker in Xicheng, who is originally from Xingtai (邢台) in Hebei 
Province, expressed concern that the government would first expel workers without 
Beijing hukou, and then bring in workers from parts of Beijing municipality outside of 
the city centre to fill the gaps created. This way, while Beijing’s population does decrease 
on paper, the government is merely shifting people around in reality. The logic behind 
this strategy strongly resembles redrawing administrative borders in order to virtually 
increase urbanisation, without any actual urbanisation having taken place (see Liu et al., 
2015: 39).
People who are directly affected summarise their predicament with the expression 
mei banfa (没办法, one cannot do anything about it). Nonetheless, even among those 
who face severe life- changing consequences, such as losing the basis of their livelihood 
and having to relocate, there are voices subscribing to China’s development and mod-
ernisation narrative. They are seeing themselves as the unlucky ones who have to make 
a sacrifice so that others may thrive, while at the same time still showing some amount 
of understanding for it.
Even though there is a discourse in public, “elements outside the state, such as public 
participation and civil society, are insufficiently developed” (Zou and Zhao, 2018). As 
such, there also is only a very limited influence that citizens may have on the policy- 
making process or the implementation of the emerging policies. In most cases, it is 
already too late for citizens to change the official stance, so their sentiment of mei banfa 
is somewhat appropriate.
This observation fits well with high- modernist planning ideology: its aspects of stan-
dardisation and formal order demand a rigidity that does not account for individual 
needs. Likewise, the hierarchical planning approach denies lower levels their voice and 
leads to new forms of social exclusion.
Even though the master plan wants to “achieve that people leave [Beijing] following 
the [dispelled] functions and industries” (Beijing Municipal Commission for City 
Planning and Land Resources Management, 2017: chap. 1, sec. 3, art. 14), in practice, it 
brings about many problems. From an economic viewpoint, the closest province, Hebei, 
is not as attractive as Beijing at the moment and thus enterprises and their employees 
will try to avoid having to relocate there (Zou and Zhao, 2018). From a societal view-
point, it is problematic that the decision to relocate people and functions has been made 
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without public participation, which led to a very low willingness to leave Beijing 
(Anonymous, 2018). This low willingness to leave results in the situation that even 
though “the functions are not there anymore, the people are still there, and the people 
have not become less [either]” (Anonymous, 2018). That is to say, if nothing is done to 
increase the attractiveness of Hebei, even coercive measures will hardly be able to 
counter the labour market’s influence. Nonetheless, due to factual constraints, many will 
have to leave even if they do not wish to do so, even if Kennedy and Chen (2018) argue 
that nowadays, implementation through campaigns may have positive effects that lead to 
policy acceptance and greater compliance.
On the other hand, young people make up the largest portion of the floating popula-
tion, as, for example, in 2010, more than forty- three percent of it inside cities were 
between the ages of fifteen and twenty- nine (National Bureau of Statistics, 2012: 7-2a, 
own calculations, excluding population that is separated from their households within 
the municipal district). Therefore, Beijing is losing a lot by expelling these young peo-
ple from the city, because “city development is reliant on young people – the labour 
force of young people” (Anonymous, 2018). This is confirmed also by Florida (2012: 
306), who states that it is precisely young workers who are the “workhorses” of the 
communities.
The master plan only stipulates to “provide better opportunities for college and uni-
versity graduates to start a business or seek employment in Beijing” (Beijing Municipal 
Commission for City Planning and Land Resources Management, 2017: chap. 3, sec. 5, 
art. 52). However, university graduates who will be left in Beijing are not willing to 
perform jobs, such as sanitation work or express delivery, that were previously done by 
those that are driven out of the city (Anonymous, 2018). Unsurprisingly, industries that 
are heavily reliant on migrant workers were facing problems since the evictions began 
(Friedman, 2017). This is also in line with the migrant workers’ self- perception: “‘How 
can Beijing get by without migrant workers? […] We do every job that the locals won’t 
do’” (Buckley, 2017a).
A future problem ties in with the relationship between public service provision and 
the household registration system (户籍制度, huji zhidu). The current master plan aims 
to “establish a public service provision mechanism based on residence permits” (Beijing 
Municipal Commission for City Planning and Land Resources Management, 2017: 
chap. 1, sec. 3, art. 14, cl. 3). If this is thought through, even public transport could even-
tually be available only to those that hold a valid residence permit (居住证, juzhuzheng). 
This fits nicely with a migrant worker’s impression that “‘Beijing doesn’t want us,’” 
even though “‘We’re all Chinese, this is our capital too, the people’s capital’” (Buckley, 
2017a).
The examples above show how the government’s approach leads to problems in many 
areas, including societal, legal, and economic issues. High modernism’s credo of “rule 
by the plan” in combination with coercive top- down measures not only largely ignores 
citizens’ needs and violates their rights, it also creates unintended consequences that 
“push the state into schizophrenic behavior” (Friedman, 2017), leading to the eviction of 
people who are actually important to the city’s functioning.
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Conclusion
The Chinese government is not only using urban planning to improve the living environ-
ment of Beijing’s inhabitants, but urban planning also serves as an instrument of popu-
lation control. Population control is integrated into urban planning through a framework 
of high modernism and is implemented with the help of campaign- style institutionalised 
mobilisation. While urbanisation has largely been understood as a governance tool for 
growth, with research focusing on economic incentives for state- led urbanisation, this 
article adds that the state has governance incentives for urban planning. Specifically, the 
state is using exclusionary hierarchisation, where the incentives are not primarily eco-
nomic, for social control and consolidation of state authority. Because of the focus on 
growth as a driver for urbanisation and the focus on the state entanglement in the land 
market, neoliberalism and state entrepreneurialism have been brought forth as interpre-
tive frameworks. This article adds that high modernism helps in understanding the non- 
economic incentives and the resulting state behaviour. Finally, this article adds that 
campaign- style implementation is still used today, and that institutionalised mobilisation 
can be found as the measure employed in the Daxing case. This contributes another data 
point to the study of policy implementation and challenges assumptions that campaigns 
are a relic of the past.
Today, basically everyone is able to plan cities by using “plug ‘n’ play formulas [that] 
can be readily mastered by community activists and put to good use without sophisti-
cated social science research” (Gleye, 2015). This kind of planning without the neces-
sary expertise, however, leads to plans that do not account for anything beyond a 
cookie- cutter approach and lack consideration of their social consequences.
This observation is especially important in the light of the government’s very own 
top- level guidelines of Putting People First (以人为本, yirenweiben) of Hu Jintao’s 
Scientific Outlook on Development, or the newer People- Centred Approach 
(以人民为中心, yi renmin wei zhongxin) of Xi Jinping Thought. Moreover, evicted ten-
ants in Daxing or the shop owner in Dashilanr experienced a legal uncertainty that needs 
to be contrasted with the government’s proclaimed goal of fully advancing law- based 
governance (全面推进依法治国, quanmian tuijin yifa- zhiguo).
Problems include coercive implementation measures that destroy the source of liveli-
hood, forced relocation, and destruction of social space as well as of historical and cul-
tural heritage. Due to the nature of these problems, it is absolutely necessary to better 
include the public in the decision- making process for urban planning. Especially the 
affected inhabitants need to be taken into account, otherwise, top- down mechanisms will 
only lead to further dissatisfaction.
Arguably, in order to improve urban planning processes, the Chinese government 
could learn from its past experience with large- scale social engineering, for example 
the one- child policy. On the issue of the one- child policy, many of the problems pres-
ent today, such as the 4–2–1 structure, have been foretold by social scientists, such as 
Liang Zhongtang (梁中堂), but were dismissed at that time (see Greenhalgh, 2008). 
Therefore, experts need to be tied in more firmly to foresee and prevent future 
problems.
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While urban planning as a means for population control might yield positive short- 
term results, its long- term implications entail a massive social injustice. This circum-
stance reflects the campaign- style implementation and its underlying problems, once 
more. Because using urban planning for population control as such is questionable, pol-
icymakers need to turn to different strategies for tackling the challenges that are created 
through Beijing’s large population. A high- modernist, one- dimensional approach to 
urban planning is not expedient in this case, and destruction of social spaces will turn the 
city into a lifeless and anonymous place. Eventually, a top–down, centralist approach 
will create focal points again rather than promote balanced, even development.
Nonetheless, judging from the Chinese practice of “proceeding from point to surface” 
(Heilmann, 2011) (由点到面, you dian dao mian), it can be assumed that the develop-
ments seen in Beijing will also appear elsewhere. Some fifteen years ago, Shanghai’s 
Xintiandi (新天地, New World) was constructed through the Shanghai model mentioned 
above, that is, through relocation of inhabitants and large- scale reconstruction. In today’s 
Xintiandi, one can only find “brand- name shops, cinemas, wine bars, nightclubs, and 
galleries catering to a wealthy clientele of tourists and locals” (Ren et al., 2018: 106), 
which shows that gentrification is one of the goals of city redevelopment (Tomba, 2017). 
Another instance of this practice can be found in Shanghai’s former Rue du Consulat 
(now 金陵东路, Jinling donglu), mirroring the Beijing phenomenon (Knyazeva, 2016).
These past examples of state- led gentrification had an economic focus that approved 
evictions and that were focused on place- making in the lucrative city centre. While 
Beijing undoubtedly is also a case of this practice, it has additionally shown a strong 
push for population control leading to evictions in the periphery. The difference from 
these past examples is that population control follows so strongly from the urban master 
plan. Because the master plan is based on high modernism, it intends to render the city 
more legible to the government, which adds a dimension of population control to the 
policy, extending its powers. In the case of Beijing, this form of population control man-
ifests itself as evictions accomplished through campaign- style implementation. This 
common basis thus yields a nexus of gentrification, displacement, and population con-
trol, following from the high- modernist framework.
If Beijing is an experimental point (试点, shidian) for using urban planning as a 
means for population control, then the extension of the set of instruments that was 
applied in Beijing could also be used in other megacities, such as Shanghai, where state- 
led gentrification can readily be found, or even in whole city clusters. This becomes even 
more important considering that Shanghai has also set quite an ambitious population 
target of twenty- five million in 2035, which, in the case of Beijing, arguably was one of 
the main drivers to expedite population control measures.
Lastly, it remains to be asked what alternatives exist to evictions as a form of urban 
planning. How could developments coming from urban villages (城中村, chengzhong-
cun), for example, be an alternative, more citizen- based model for city development that 
acts as a counterweight to the Disneyfication of cultural heritage? In order to realise 
sustainable development, future planning needs to include more public opinion and 
incorporate social justice. In its current form of using campaign- style implementation 
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methods with an underlying framework of high modernism, urban planning will only 
serve to create new forms of social exclusion.
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